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INTRODUCTION
“John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it.”1
President Andrew Jackson, while embroiled in conflicts with the Cherokee
Nation, is said to have uttered this quote in response to the Supreme
Court’s 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia, where the Court held that
state laws could not supersede Native American law on tribal lands.2
To this day, it is not certain whether Jackson ever truly uttered this
quotation.3 The statement nevertheless remains an excellent portrayal of
the tension inherent between the executive and judiciary throughout this
country’s history.
Since the Court’s decision in Worcester, this level of executive
animosity towards Article III courts is rarely seen. Nevertheless, this
tension still manifests itself, albeit in a very different manner.4 Most
recently, this tension is seen, for example, in the Trump Administration’s
attempts to restrict immigration from certain countries.5
Shortly after taking office, President Donald Trump passed a series of
executive orders restricting certain foreign nationals from traveling into

1. Arthur J. Sabin, Why We Honor John Marshal—A Brief Retrospective, 29
J. MARSHAL L. REV. 567, 571 (1996).
2. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 596 (1832).
3. Whether Jackson actually said this is sometimes questioned because the
Court in Worcester never required the judiciary to “enforce” anything. The Court
simply ruled the statute void and vacated the conviction. Id.
4. See, for example, the litigation involving President Trump’s “travel ban.”
Whether the President intended any actual belligerence against the judiciary,
which continued to invalidate his executive orders, or simply intended to find a
scheme that was legal to implement his agenda, a reading of the latter judicial
opinions concerning these orders suggests the courts were unhappy at being
required to again consider these issues. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662,
672–73 (9th Cir. 2017) (“For the third time, we are called upon to assess the
legality of the President’s efforts to bar over 150 million nationals of six
designated countries from entering the United States or being issued immigrant
visas . . . .”).
5. For a prominent example of this litigation, see Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F.
Supp. 3d 1119, 1120 (D. Haw. 2017).
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the country.6 Though their issuance was controversial, the President
defended these executive orders by asserting that they were designed to
protect the national interest.7 Various states and organizations
continuously challenged the constitutionality of these executive orders,
both in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.8 Opponents of this immigration
policy first brought litigation in the Western District of Washington, where
the court issued a preliminary injunction blocking the President’s use of
the first version of his travel ban.9 On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court refused the government’s request
to stay this injunction.10 In an attempt to remove the defects that the trial
court found in the first version, the President amended and re-promulgated
the executive order and voluntarily dismissed any further appeals.11
Nevertheless, on a challenge from the state of Hawaii, the United States
Court for the District of Hawaii also enjoined and blocked the President’s
enforcement of the second version.12 The Ninth Circuit took up appeal
from this judgment and again refused to issue a stay.13 Once more, the
Trump Administration amended and re-promulgated the executive order
in attempt to cure its defects, and once more the district of Hawaii enjoined
its enforcement.14 Again, the Ninth Circuit took up appeal of this case and,

6. Id. The President’s executive order would ban immigrants from six
countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—from entry in the
United States for 90 days. See Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry
Into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
7. Hawaii, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 1120.
8. See id.; Washington v. Trump, C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *3
(W.D. Wash. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d
539, 566 (D. Md. 2017); State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160–61 (D. Haw.
2017).
9. Trump, 2017 WL 462040, at *3.
10. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017).
11. Hawaii, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 1122.
12. Id. at 1140. For an example of parallel litigation, see Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (enjoining the enforcement of Section
2(c) of the second executive order).
13. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 789 (9th Cir. 2017). It is worth noting
that the Ninth Circuit did limit the injunction insofar as it affected “inward-facing
agency conduct.” Id. For the appeal of the previously mentioned parallel
litigation, see Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 606 (maintaining the
district of Maryland’s injunction except in regard to enjoining the President
himself).
14. State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160–61 (D. Haw. 2017).
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for a third time, refused to grant a stay on the preliminary injunction.15
This cycle, however, was not the end of the litigation.16
Soon after the Ninth Circuit reached its decision on the third version
of the President’s travel ban, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the findings of the Fourth and Ninth Circuit courts.17 The Supreme
Court, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority, found that the
state of Hawaii failed to meet its burden for overcoming the language in 5
U.S.C. § 1182(f), which gave broad discretion to the President for
excluding illegal aliens.18 Moreover, using rational basis review, Chief
Justice Roberts concluded that the President had not violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.19
The Court’s majority opinion addressed the lower courts’ rulings only
on the merits and never addressed the nature of the district court’s
remedy.20 Justice Thomas, motivated by this omission, filed a concurring
opinion discussing the use of not only the temporary restraining order in
this case, but universal injunctions in general.21 Justice Thomas noted that
“[d]istrict courts . . . have begun imposing universal injunctions without
considering their authority to grant such sweeping relief.”22 Justice
Thomas then went on to argue that there were several problems with
universal injunctions.23 In particular, they “prevent[] legal questions from
percolating through the federal courts, encourag[e] forum shopping, and
mak[e] every case a national emergency for the courts and for the
Executive Branch.”24 The universal injunction represents the stiffest
remedy a court can give for redress of executive malfeasance.25 Such an
15. Hawaii, 878 F.3d at 702. The court did limit the injunction to those
immigrants “with a credible bona fide relationship with the United States.” Id.
16. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2407.
19. Id. at 2420–23. For the Establishment Clause, see U.S. CONST. amend. I
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).
20. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (concluding that “[o]ur disposition of the case
makes it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the nationwide scope of the
injunction issued by the District Court”).
21. Id. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 2425 (Thomas, J., concurring).
23. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
24. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
25. For example, compare universal injunctions with declaratory judgments,
which state only the rights present for a given plaintiff, or compensatory
judgments, which award only monetary damages for malfeasance. Both of these
remedies restrict themselves to only the parties before the court. For a declaratory
judgment example, see Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 108
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imposition and this remedy’s ever-increasing popularity among federal
courts have heightened the tension that exists between the executive and
judiciary.26 It has relocated questions of abuse of constitutional power
from the executive, as per Andrew Jackson, to the federal judiciary.
Justice Thomas’s findings on the appropriateness of the universal
injunction as a remedy are hardly conclusive, nor has the Supreme Court
since adopted them.27 Nevertheless, these injunctions suffer from a
number of defects, both of law and policy. Universal injunctions suffer
from legal defects, in that they not only fail to comport with equity limits
on Article III courts, but also impute false universality to judicial decisions
and reach beyond the case or controversy at hand.28 Universal injunctions
are also bad policy, as they encourage forum shopping and over-reliance
on ideology, reverse the precedent model used for judicial decisionmaking, and halt the percolation of questions of law through the courts.29
Ultimately, courts should stop imposing universal injunctions and replace
them with injunctions that apply only within the jurisdiction of the court
which issued them.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the historical background for suing
and enjoining the executive, as well as the genesis and proliferation of
universal injunctions through the lower courts. Part II will argue that there
are severe legal defects that should inhibit federal courts from imposing
universal injunctions. Next, in Part III, this Comment will discuss the
challenges that universal injunctions, even if legal, pose for the judiciary
from a policy standpoint, including issues of forum shopping, percolation,
and the precedent model of judicial decision-making. Part IV will explore
and critique the most compelling arguments for the appropriateness of the
universal injunction. Finally, Part V will discuss two alternatives to the
universal injunction: (1) the most ideal approach, which mandates that
injunctions apply only to plaintiffs in the case at hand, and (2) the more
practical middle-ground approach, whereby courts might issue injunctions
that apply only to their jurisdiction. Ultimately, this Comment will
conclude that, although less congruent with the origins and history of the
(D.D.C. 2008). For an example of compensatory damages for executive
malfeasance, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
26. See infra Section I.C.
27. When the Court has been presented with these injunctions, they have
declined to consider the scope of the remedy and ruled merely on the merits of the
case itself. See, e.g., Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
28. For the origin of the “cases and controversies” language, see U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
29. See generally Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–25 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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federal judiciary, the best and immediate solution to this problem is a rule
that would restrict courts to issuing only jurisdiction-specific injunctions,
with these injunctions being binding only upon a finding and notification
that the issuing court had correctly laid jurisdiction and venue.
I. TAKING ON THE GIANT: SUING AND ENJOINING THE EXECUTIVE
The emergence of the universal injunction as an equitable remedy
represents a continuing evolution of the judiciary’s approach to cases and
controversies where the executive is a party.30 Before exploring the
genesis and propagation of these injunctions, it is necessary to discuss the
extent to which the judiciary has broadened the relief it has granted over
the years regarding suits against the executive.
A. Suing the Executive: The Original Understanding
The validity of universal injunctions comprises two basic
requirements. First, their validity turns on whether the executive is subject
to suit or, as at common law, the executive can claim sovereign
immunity.31 Second, if the executive is subject to suit, universal
injunctions also require that it is within the power of federal courts to
enjoin the executive.32
1. The Right to Sue the Executive
For the majority of its history, the United States has permitted suits
against the executive.33 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the contours
of the right to sue the executive in the 1882 case of United States v. Lee.34
In Lee, the estate of General Robert E. Lee asked the Court to void an
30. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the
National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 428 (2017).
31. The Framers of the Constitution debated the extent to which sovereign
immunity, the notion that the king or government was exempted from suit, applied
to the new constitutional republic. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 764 (1999)
(discussing the extent to which the government and the original colonies enjoyed
sovereign immunity).
32. The lesser power to enjoin is a necessary precursor to the greater power
to enjoin universally. It would be illogical for Article III courts to be denied the
power to enjoin the executive’s conduct with regard to only the parties in a case
or controversy but to still allow them to enjoin conduct with respect to all similarly
situated parties.
33. See generally United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882).
34. Id.
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ejectment order that a Virginia state court issued on the U.S. government.35
The U.S. attorney general, making a special appearance, asserted that even
if the ejectment were without error, the courts had no jurisdiction to hear
the case because the United States could not be sued without consent.36
Writing for the majority, Justice Miller parsed the history of bringing
lawsuits against the sovereign, going back to pre-founding Great Britain.37
English common law deemed it absurd that the king would be amenable
to suit without prior consent because, in essence, he would be sending a
writ to himself to command his presence in his own court.38 As the Court
noted, however, this absurdity is absent from the United States because
federal law recognized that process can be served on the attorney general
and because it cannot be said that appearing in its own courts degrades the
government’s dignity.39 The Lee Court noted that though other courts have
commented on the rationale of providing immunity from suits directed at
a supreme executive, no such “supreme executive” exists in the United
States, thus bringing into question total sovereign immunity of the U.S.
government.40 The Court ultimately concluded that it need not reach the
broader question of whether the United States as a whole possesses
sovereign immunity because this dispute was not a suit against the United
States but against officers of the United States.41 The Court recited several
cases involving similar disputes and ultimately held that maligned parties
can correctly bring such suits.42 Relying on its precedent in this area, as
well as the judiciary’s understanding of individual rights,43 the Court held
35. Id. at 197.
36. Id. at 204.
37. Id. at 205.
38. Id. at 206.
39. Id. The Court cited the case of Chisholm v. Georgia for the former
proposition; for the latter, the Court noted that the government “is constantly
appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting its rights as against the citizens
to their judgment.” Id.
40. Id. Citing the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, the Court referenced the
various dangers of subjecting a supreme executive to repeated suits, namely the
endangering of his ability to serve the public as sovereign. Id.
41. Id. at 210.
42. See, e.g., id. at 212–14 (quoting Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 842–43, 846–47, 850–51 (1824)). In particular, Chief Justice Marshall in
Osborn noted that though courts in chancery cannot usually bring an injunction
against any parties not before it, it would be an injustice to not allow the
substituting of agents because, failing this, the state could be above the law.
Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 842–43.
43. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 219–20. Citing Chief Justice John Marshall, as well
as the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, the Court
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that, even if the United States as sovereign might be immune to suit, the
same cannot be said of individual members of the executive branch.44 This
proposition of law remains an understood rationale for suits against
individual officers in the executive.45
2. The Right to an Injunction
Throughout the 19th century, it was not uncommon for courts to enjoin
the federal government from the enforcement of a statute.46 In all cases,
the injunctions blocked the executive’s enforcement only with respect to
the plaintiff before the court, rather than all possible plaintiffs.47
For example, in the matter of Georgia v. Atkins, the State of Georgia
filed a bill of equity to enjoin the collection of certain money that the local
United States tax collector claimed was owed to the United States.48 The
court, in construing the act, held that the term “corporation” did not
include states, and thus issued the injunction against the collector that
Georgia requested.49 The court strictly limited its injunction to the State of
Georgia and did not extend the injunctive relief sought.50 Though the
holding here has a logical connection to the collection of taxes against any
state in the union under the same act, the court did not issue an injunction
concerning other such tax collection in this manner.51
The level of restraint from the Atkins court in its imposition of the
injunction extended far beyond the lower federal courts, with even the
argued that, for those whose rights were violated, there were but two choices: they
could resort to tribunals or they could resist, amounting to a crime. Further, in
submitting to a tribunal for investigation, that tribunal necessarily obtains
jurisdiction over the matter at hand. Id.
44. Id. at 219–21. The Court opined that “no man in this country. . . is above
the law” and that “all the officers of the government . . . are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it.” Id.
45. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452
(1883); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 167, 213 (1897); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731, 736–37 (1947); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 645–46 (1962) (citing
Lee’s reasoning with approval numerous times in holding that suits against
executive officers are possible).
46. See, e.g., Georgia v. Atkins, 10 F. Cas. 241, 241 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Ga. 1866);
Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 112 (1897).
47. See, e.g., Atkins, 10 F. Cas. at 241; Scott, 165 U.S. at 112.
48. Atkins, 10 F. Cas. at 241.
49. Id. at 243.
50. See generally id.
51. See id. In fact, the injunctive relief did not even attach to all dealings
against the state of Georgia, but only to the collection of this specific tax. Id.
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Supreme Court justifying this approach to injunctions against the
executive.52 In the matter of Scott v. Donald, the Supreme Court
determined the extent to which the defendant, in seizing liquor subject to
an unconstitutional statute, should be enjoined against the statute’s
enforcement.53 The plaintiff asserted that this injunction should extend to
the executive’s restriction on liquor importation against any party based
on this statute, on the grounds that such an injunction is the only adequate
remedy and that it would save a multiplicity of suits.54 Although the Court
acknowledged that injunctive relief for the plaintiff against the executive
officers was appropriate, it refused to enjoin the executive with respect to
all similarly situated parties.55 The Court rejected the argument that the
plaintiff may, on his own, speak for the entire class of similarly situated
persons.56 The Court concluded that it is reasonable to presume that once
executive officers are made aware of the unconstitutionality of a statute,
they will voluntarily refrain from enforcing it.57 Further, the Court opined
that it would be unreasonable to hold officers of the executive in contempt
for violating an injunction in a case in which they were not represented.58
However, it would be little more than six decades before this limited
understanding of injunctive relief would cease to hold sway over the
federal judiciary.
B. The Universal Injunction: Genesis and the Changing Judicial
Landscape
Although the original understanding of the power to sue and enjoin
executive officers remained constant for many years, federal judges
shifted their stances on the use of injunctions midway through the 20th
century.59 This change in understanding revolutionized federal courts’
understanding of limits on remedies against the executive and ultimately
52. Scott, 165 U.S. at 112.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 115.
56. Id. at 116. Accepting the holdings of lower courts on this issue, the Court
noted that few cases in equity can ever be said to affect only the party before it,
and no lawyer would be willing to argue that an injunction involving all similarly
situated parties would always be appropriate. Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 F. Cas. 1079,
1080 (Cir. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1865).
57. Scott, 165 U.S. at 117.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Harlem Val. Transp. Ass’n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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culminated in the universal injunction becoming an equitable remedy that
was regularly used.60
1. A New Mode of Judicial Power: Stiffening Remedies against
Executive Violations
Universal injunctions represent a form of equitable relief that federal
courts have only recently accepted.61 The first mention of the universal
injunction was in Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co., a 1963 D.C. Circuit case.62
An administrative law demanded due process before wage fixing, and
several members of the electric motor industry challenged the defects in
this process.63 The D.C. Circuit did not have sufficient information in the
record to issue a ruling and remanded the case to the district court for
further findings.64
This remand was far from the D.C. Circuit’s final word on the matter.
In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit included a section entitled “Scope of the
Remedy,” in which the court considered the proper relief owed to the Wirtz
plaintiffs and the industry as a whole.65 The plaintiffs argued that they filed
suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated parties, thus making it
a class action.66 The executive, however, argued that the case could not be
a class action, as per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.67 The D.C.
Circuit did not truly dispense with the dispute, concluding that it need not
resolve it, as it would be appropriate to enjoin the executive against all
similarly situated parties regardless.68
The D.C. Circuit first noted that whenever the Supreme Court speaks,
the executive should follow the Court’s principle in cases of essentially
similar character.69 Additionally, when presented with similarly situated
parties, lower courts usually give the same relief to all similarly situated
60. See infra Section I.C.
61. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that universal injunctions did not emerge until a century and
a half after the founding).
62. Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 521.
63. Id. at 521–22.
64. Id. at 535.
65. Id. at 533–35.
66. Id. at 533.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 534 (arguing that “the principles announced by the court—at least
if it is the Supreme Court which speaks—should be followed by the administrator
in all cases of essentially similar character”).
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parties.70 Further, the Court noted that if it granted the relief sought for
only those plaintiffs who had standing to sue, they would have an
unconscionable bargaining advantage over other firms in the industry.71
The D.C. Circuit analogized its power over the executive to its power over
Congress, noting that had Congress promulgated an unconstitutional
statute, this statute would be unconstitutional not only toward the
plaintiffs, but against all other parties.72 The court concluded that “if one
or more of the plaintiffs-appellees is or are found to have standing to sue,
the District Court should enjoin the effectiveness of the Secretary [of
Labor’s] determination with respect to the entire industry.”73
Wirtz represented the first of three cases, all in the 1960s and 1970s,
to conceptualize the universal injunction.74 In 1968, the Supreme Court, in
Flast v. Cohen, contemplated whether an injunction barring federal
expenditures to purchase textbooks for parochial schools was
appropriate.75 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren noted that
though the dispute involved only New York programs, the district court’s
ruling would “cast sufficient doubt on similar programs elsewhere as to
cause confusion approaching paralysis to surround the challenged
statute.”76 In 1973, in Harlem Valley Transportation Ass’n v. Stafford, the
Southern District of New York concluded that the plaintiffs were sufficient
to constitute a class of similarly situated parties and issued a preliminary
injunction against certain violations of the National Environmental Policy
Act.77
Although these cases laid a foundation for a change in the landscape
of equitable remedies against the executive, courts did not immediately

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The D.C. Circuit noted that a statute “would necessarily be regarded
as unconstitutional as to all persons similarly situated, and not merely as to those
who brought the suit attacking it.” Id.
73. Id. at 535.
74. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1968); Harlem Val. Transp.
Ass’n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
75. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.
76. Id. at 89–90. This is not to say that the Court directly sanctioned the
imposition of a universal injunction, as the Flast Court was only tasked with
resolving an issue of standing. Nevertheless, this logic is directly applicable to
such an imposition. If the district judge is sufficiently convinced that the narrow
scope of such an injunction could lead to “paralysis” of the regulation, it might
decide to enjoin the government against all such programs. Id .
77. Harlem Val. Transp. Ass’n, 360 F. Supp. at 1066.
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begin utilizing universal injunctions with regularity.78 One case in which
such an injunction might have been appropriate was the Second Circuit’s
decision in Campbell v. Secretary of Department of Health & Human
Services.79 In this case, the Second Circuit examined regulations
concerning the denial of disability benefits, and held that the secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services was required to provide a
list of alternative jobs that fit the definition of “light work” as found in the
relevant regulations.80 Even though the Second Circuit never expressly
struck down these regulations, in its opinion reversing the Second Circuit’s
findings, the Supreme Court noted that the Second Circuit’s decision
requiring the secretary to present such a list of jobs effectively rendered
the guidelines useless.81 However, ultimately the Second Circuit’s
decision did nothing more than establish future precedent.82 Rather than
enjoin the secretary’s conduct with regard to other similarly situated
parties, the court only established the principle that, when similarly
situated parties might emerge, the secretary must provide them with the
same list.83
It is worth noting that the Second Circuit never provided any
explanation as to why it did not impose a universal injunction. An
evaluation of the arguments that the Wirtz court used suggests that the
Second Circuit would have been justified had it chosen to do so.84 There
may be two explanations for not imposing such an injunction. First, the
Second Circuit would not be obliged to follow D.C. Circuit precedent: if
it disagreed with the Wirtz court’s reasoning, it could have simply ignored
78. See, e.g., Campbell v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., 665 F.2d
48, 54 (2d Cir. 1981), rev’d, Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 470 (1981).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 465 (1981).
82. The notion of this decision as future precedent stems not from its actual
application in any future case, since the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit before any such decision was forthcoming, but rather in the fact that courts
in that circuit would have been required to follow the principles the court
articulated.
83. Id. at 465. As the Supreme Court noted, the Second Circuit’s decision
rendered the regulations unenforceable, at least within that circuit. Logically,
then, future applicants would have to be provided with the same list as was the
plaintiff in this case. Id.
84. Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (discussing
the scope of the remedy afforded to the plaintiffs and its reasons for its remedy).
For example, it would be unlikely that courts would afford a similarly situated
party different relief and not mandate that the secretary provide them the same
lists.
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it with no consequences.85 Second, at the time, universal injunctions were
still a new remedy, which had not yet proliferated through the federal
courts.
2. “Universal” vs. “Nationwide” Injunctive Relief
Federal judges often erroneously call universal injunctions “national”
or “nationwide” injunctions.86 The critical difference between a
nationwide injunction and a universal injunction concerns the scope of the
issued injunction, namely, the “who” and “where” involved.87 On the one
hand, injunctions might be restricted by the “where,” or the geographic
location in which the injunction has the force of law.88 On the other hand,
the “who” outlines the group of people for whom the government is
mandated to enforce the judicial decree, compared to those for whom it is
not.89 The issuing of truly “national” injunctions is appropriate to protect
a plaintiff from the executive’s enforcement of a defective law or
regulation wherever he or she might go.90 Universal injunctions are
“universal” because they speak to the who, rather than where, in their
scope.91 Whereas a nationwide injunction is defined by its geography—
the United States—universal injunctions apply to the entire universe of
similarly situated parties, whether or not they are part of the litigation in
which the injunction was issued.92
C. From Conception to Explosion: The Proliferation of Universal
Injunctions Through Lower Courts
The newly minted power of federal courts to enjoin the executive over
not only the plaintiffs in a particular case, but also to all similarly situated
85. As courts of appeals have noted, though opinions of sister circuits may
have some import in reasoning, they are never binding precedent. See, e.g., United
States v. Auginash, 266 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Aldens, Inc. v.
Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1971)); Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc.,704 F.3d
272, 278 (6th Cir. 2010); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829
F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
86. Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really
“Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 335, 349 (2018).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 350.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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parties remained relatively dormant through the end of the 20th century.
In recent years, however, the popularity of the universal injunction has
exploded, with district courts more likely than ever to issue such
injunctions.93 Federal courts have issued universal injunctions against
multiple administrations, including the Bush, Obama, and Trump
Administrations.94 These injunctions cover various kinds of litigation, and
federal courts now use them as remedies in many areas in which the
lawfulness of executive action is at controversy.95
1. The Bush Administration: Environmental Regulations
In 1992, the Forest Service, an administrative agency, sought to
overhaul its administrative appeal procedures, replacing them with a
“predecision notice comment period.”96 Earth Island Institute, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), brought suit in the matter of Earth
Island Institute v. Pengilly to challenge the validity of the Forest Service’s
practice.97 The plaintiffs, who were regular visitors to national forests in
California, asserted that the regulations impeded them from challenging
Forest Service projects.98
The district court first refuted the government’s contentions that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for an injunction and that this case did not
present an issue that was ripe for review.99 Dispensing with these asserted
obstacles to litigation, as well as the correct standard of review, the district
court next turned to the various assertions of malfeasance.100 The court
reviewed the merits of the asserted regulatory defects and held that several
of the regulations that the Forest Service promulgated in 2003 fell outside
93. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D.
Cal. 2005); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015);
Washington v. Trump, C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *3 (W.D. Wash.
2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1122 (D. Haw. 2017); Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 566 (D. Md. 2017).
94. See infra Sections I.C.1–3.
95. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 999; Texas, 86 F. Supp.
3d at 604; E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 846–47
(N.D. Cal. 2018).
96. Earth Island Inst., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 999. Instead of the appeals process
the agency previously used, this “predecision” period would subject new
regulations to a notice-and-comment period. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1000.
99. Id. at 1001–02.
100. Id. at 1004.
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of the agency’s authority and severed the regulations.101 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit bifurcated its analysis similarly to that of the lower court.102
The court first asked whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
disputed regulations.103 It then analyzed the correctness of the district
court’s conclusions concerning the ripeness of the litigation.104
Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit rejected the agency’s
argument that the plaintiffs suffered no cognizable injury in fact.105 Noting
the loss of the ability to appeal certain forest service projects, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs can reasonably be said to lose certain
recreational enjoyments they might otherwise have.106 Because Congress
contemplated public participation in the appeals process, and the agency
denied said process, the court concluded that an injury was present.107
In addressing whether this issue was ripe for review, the Ninth Circuit
outlined the Article III restriction on federal courts that created the
ripeness doctrine.108 Citing Flast v. Cohen, the court noted its restriction
to hear only “cases and controversies,” in particular those that stem only
from facts present in the case.109 Parsing the framework of jurisprudence
concerning the ripeness doctrine, the court held that only those provisions
that the agency used were severable and that all other provisions the
district court severed were not ripe for dispute.110 Finding both standing
for the plaintiffs, as well as ripeness concerning certain regulations that
the district court severed, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the supposed
nationwide injunction as to those regulations.111 Finally, it denied the
government’s request to limit the scope of the injunction to the Eastern
District of California, instead continuing to apply it nationwide.112 Though
both courts referred to the injunction as “nationwide,” the actual end result
was a universal injunction that prohibited the Forest Service from
enforcing the regulations that the Eastern District had severed.113
101. Id. at 1011.
102. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 2009).
103. Id. at 693–94.
104. Id. at 695.
105. Id. at 693.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 694.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 696.
111. Id. at 699.
112. Id.
113. See generally Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1011
(E.D. Cal. 2005).
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2. The Obama Administration: Immigration and Resettlement
During President Obama’s second term in office, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) sought to implement a program named the
“Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents” (DAPA).114 DAPA’s stated purpose was to legalize those
members of the “shadow population” that the government simply had no
resources to deport.115 Twenty-six states brought suit in the matter of Texas
v. United States, seeking an injunction to prohibit DAPA’s
implementation on the theory that DHS’s regulation violated the Take
Care Clause of the Constitution.116
The Southern District began its analysis by reviewing grounds for
standing.117 The Southern District relied on Article III standing,118
“prudential” standing,119 and standing under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) when it found that the states involved had standing to sue.120
After finding standing for the states, the court noted that the states met the
four factors that are appropriate for the imposition of a preliminary
injunction: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
substantial threat that the states will suffer if no injunction is imposed; (3)
that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the injunction might cause
the defendants; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public
interest.121 The court then imposed the injunction on the grounds that the
secretary passed DAPA without meeting the APA enumerated
requirements.122 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed in full with the district
court’s analysis and affirmed its judgment.123 Later, on petition of
certiorari, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s
114. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 607.
117. Id. at 614.
118. Id. at 607.
119. Id. at 614.
120. Id. at 615.
121. Id. at 646.
122. Id. at 677. For the requirements imposed for passing new rules under the
APA, referred to as “notice and comment” rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)
(“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register . . . .”), and id. § 553(c) (“After notice required by this section, the
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation.”).
123. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015).
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holding.124 As with the Earth Island case, the end result of litigation was
a universal injunction that blocked the Obama Administration from
enforcement of an administrative program.125
3. The Trump Administration: Asylum
In November of 2018, the Trump Administration undertook two
asylum-related actions that became the subject of national controversy.126
In particular, the Department of Justice, in combination with the DHS,
added a restriction that categorically barred the entry of aliens who
violated certain presidential proclamations.127 Coinciding with this
regulation, President Trump issued an executive order suspending the
entry of aliens through the border of Mexico, excepting those who entered
through a port of entry.128 These two executive orders became the subject
of litigation in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump.129
In East Bay, the Northern District of California found standing for East
Bay Sanctuary Covenant—an NGO—through their assertion that the
executive’s actions frustrated the goal of their mission, as established
through Ninth Circuit precedent.130 Further, the court evaluated the same
four-factor test for the temporary restraining order (TRO).131 Concluding
that the four-factor test was amply satisfied, the court imposed the TRO,
blocking the Trump Administration’s two regulations governing asylumseekers.132
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to lift the TRO against the Trump
Administration.133 The court concluded, as did the district court, that the
regulations likely violated provisions in the United States Code that set

124. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
125. See Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677–78 (enjoining the implementation of
DAPA).
126. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 846–47 (N.D.
Cal. 2018).
127. Id. (citing Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential
Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9,
2018)).
128. Id. at 847.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 868.
131. Id. at 854; see also Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 646 (S.D.
Tex. 2015) (laying out the factors for a temporary restraining order).
132. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 868.
133. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018).
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guidelines for executive action concerning asylum-seekers.134 As a result,
the district court’s injunction was appropriate.135 Noting that equitable
relief may “be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to
provide complete relief to the plaintiffs,” the Ninth Circuit nevertheless
found that the scope of the injunction was appropriate because of a need
for uniformity in immigration policy.136 Furthermore, the court concluded
that there was no tangible reason for a reduction of the scope of the
injunction.137 Additionally, the court noted that the government raised no
grounds on which to distinguish circuit precedent and failed to explain
how the district court could have crafted a narrower remedy that would
have provided complete relief to the organizations.138
These three cases represent only a small sample of the injunctions that
federal courts have issued.139 However, they illustrate the basic shift
among federal judges from plaintiff-specific to universal injunctions.140
Moreover, they show a definitive trend within Article III courts.
Regardless of the claimed executive violation, federal judges are now far
more likely to grant a universal injunction than in years past.141
II. LEGAL DEFECTS IN UNIVERSAL INJUNCTIONS
The various legal defects of universal injunctions can be divided into
several categories. First, these injunctions conflict with the equitable
principles established in the U.S. Constitution as being powers of Article
III tribunals.142 Second, these injunctions comport with the false doctrine
of judicial universality, which is the notion that judicial decisions are

134. Id. at 754; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (providing for classes of inadmissible
aliens).
135. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 754.
136. Id. at 779 (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
765 (1994)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Bray, supra note 30, at 457–59 (discussing numerous universal
injunctions issued against the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations).
140. See generally supra Sections I.C.1–3.
141. Compare the extent of the remedies in these cases with the Second
Circuit’s Campbell decision, where the court stopped short of any injunctive relief
beyond the case. See supra Section I.B.1.
142. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases . . . in Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and Treaties made . . . .”).

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 255

2/5/21 12:55 PM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

646

[Vol. 81

somehow self-executing on non-parties to the litigation.143 Finally, these
injunctions contradict long-settled judicial principles of ripeness.144
A. The Inequity of Universal Injunctions
As with all powers vested in the federal government, the root of the
powers of federal courts lies in the U.S. Constitution.145 In particular, the
Constitution allows Article III courts to hear all cases “in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”146 The universal
injunction, as a form of injunctive relief, finds its place in the set of
remedies administered under Article III courts’ equity jurisdiction.147 As
with any power vested in the courts—or in any governmental
department—such relief must find its root in either statute or the
Constitution, and there exists no such statute concerning universal
injunctions.148 The necessary inquiry, then, is whether such equitable relief
falls within the bounds of federal courts’ ability to fashion remedies as
contemplated in the Constitution. This inquiry requires a discussion of the
history of equity in England and how the framers of the Constitution
applied it to Article III tribunals.
1. The Contours of Equity
Common law courts were divided into two categories: law courts and
the Court of Chancery, with the chancellor presiding over the latter.149 The
Court of Chancery, as well as U.S. courts sitting in equity, exercised the
rigidity of strict legal rules.150 In essence, equity courts are capable of
dispensing individualized justice when the relief necessarily requires the
adaptation of circumstances to an individual case.151 In medieval England,
it was the chancellor who oversaw the dispensing of this “individual
143. Though accepted by many courts as correct, some commentators have
alleged that judicial universality is an invalid extension of judicial power. See
infra Section II.B.1.
144. See generally National Orgs. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d 682,
687 (2d Cir. 2013).
145. U.S. CONST. art. III.
146. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
147. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The
Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 610 (1997).
150. Id. at 609.
151. Id.
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justice.”152 The King of England appointed the chancellors, who were
often bishops or clergymen of the church.153 As such, the chancellors were
not versed in the rigors of common law but would, instead, create their
own body of rules and remedies.154 These remedies would, in effect, trump
the rulings of the law courts.155
Given the evolving contours of medieval English common law, the
creation of the Court of Chancery was a necessity.156 The law courts of
England derived power from the King; for parties wishing to avail
themselves of the law courts, a writ could be purchased through the
chancellor.157 As new types of disputes arose, the chancellor created new
writs to meet these new claims.158 This practice was deeply unpopular with
the lords because the issuing of new writs broadened the scope of national
power at the expense of local power.159 As a result of the English nobility’s
dissatisfaction with the system, the King prohibited the chancellor from
issuing new writs without the King’s express permission.160
Through the process of issuing writs and the subsequent ossification
of the law, courts of equity arose.161 Over time, the commercialization of
England made it impossible for writs to keep up with new
developments.162 There arose a practice that, should no writ provide the
relief sought, the plaintiffs could petition the chancellor, as an agent of the
King, to dispense justice through the King’s own good will.163 Though
highly criticized in the beginning, since the chancellor would often do little
more than consider appeals on matters of conscience,164 the chancellor
nevertheless eventually became a judicial officer, and the Court of
Chancery became the formal organ for dispensing equity.165
Though divorced from the rigors of the common law in some respects,
equity courts were always required to exercise certain discretion when
152. Id. at 610.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 611.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 613. Perhaps the most colorful deriding of the chancellor’s
dispensation of equity was that his conscience “varied with the length of his foot.”
See id.
165. Id. at 612.
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hearing cases.166 Even in England, equity courts did not tolerate petitioners
appealing only to conscience, and courts of equity required some legal
citation or some reference that equitable remedies of this nature had been
used in the past.167 As such, the discretion of judges sitting in equity was
not unbridled, but was required to rest on either a statute granting
permission for the relief sought or clear precedent establishing the right to
the requested relief.168
2. Equity at the Time of the Founding
By the time of America’s founding, English courts of equity
underwent significant evolutions, transforming from bodies that dispensed
justice only through the conscience of the chancellor to rigorous and
procedurally driven tribunals, not unlike the law courts.169 Though critics
contended otherwise in 18th-century England, courts of equity could not
replace written positive law with their own judgments.170 The discretion
of courts of equity did extend beyond the letter of the law but only when
strict adherence to the letter led to a law being too general, specific, or
defective.171 Indeed, the duty of both courts of law and of equity was to
use similar methods of legal interpretation.172
In addition, the courts of equity in England were not free from
precedent, though such was also claimed at the time.173 Similar to English
courts of law, courts of equity were bound with precedents from which
they did not, in general, depart.174 Such authority was important because,
in its absence, courts of equity could become arbitrary legislatures, rather
than courts.175 This operation of courts of equity marked a substantial
change from the days of their genesis, when chancellors dispensed
remedies that were more correctly considered awards and, as such, did not
conflate themselves with notions of precedent.176 By the 18th century, the
only true differences in the administration of justice in the two types of

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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courts were the modes of proof, trial, and relief available in each.177 In fact,
the procedures and practices in courts of equity were so well established
that they became a “regular science,” through which a petitioner might
know the remedy to which he or she was entitled and the mode of suit he
or she might use to gain it.178 These principles served as the basis of the
grant of equity powers to Article III courts.179
3. Restrictions on Article III Courts
The framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned a specific and limited
grant of powers to Article III tribunals.180 Article III courts were to be the
weakest of the three branches of government, possessing neither force nor
will, but only judgment.181 The limited scope of authority of Article III
courts came to the fore in the debate between the Federalists and AntiFederalists concerning the grant of Article III courts to hear cases arising
in equity.182 The Anti-Federalists alleged that the discretion so afforded to
judges would allow them to explain the Constitution according to its
reasoning spirit, as opposed to confining their interpretations to its letter.183
The Federalists underscored the limited nature of equity.184 They noted
that the judiciary would be “bound down by strict rules and precedents,
which serve to define and point out [judges’] duty in every particular case
that comes before them.”185 They further noted that the dispensations of
equitable remedies were limited because the principles by which they were
administered were reduced to a regular system.186 These assertions
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945). If Blackstone’s
understanding of the powers and limits of equity was correct in 1789, then they
would have been transplanted into Article III courts’ powers of equity. See
generally id.
180. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78–83 (Alexander Hamilton); see
also U.S. CONST. art. III.
181. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton notes, in his
justification for insulating Article III judges from the political process afforded to
elected officials, that the judiciary “truly [may] be said to have neither force nor
will.” Id.
182. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2426 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
183. Id.
184. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
186. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton); see also supra
Section II.A.2.
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regarding the limits of Article III courts served as the basis upon which the
Framers constructed the original understanding of the judiciary.187
The Supreme Court has recognized the restriction on the use of equity
since the founding of America.188 The Court reads statutes that give
general grants of equitable authority as constrained by the body of law
transplanted from the English Court of Chancery in 1789.189 Moreover, the
Court recently noted that broad statutory grants of equitable authority do
not give the judiciary broad leeway to fashion new remedies in equity, but
rather only give federal courts “an authority to administer in equity suits
the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised
and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time
of the separation of the two countries.”190 Therefore, when evaluating the
validity of the universal injunction, it is necessary to discern whether it
conflicts with this understanding of the discretion required in the
administration of equitable remedies.
4. Universal Injunctions: Outside the Bounds of Equity
No general statute authorizing the impositions of universal injunctions
exists, meaning that the Constitution must vest Article III courts with this
power.191 As a result, the most apt analytical method to determine whether
such relief exists within the limits of Article III is best undertaken by
ascertaining whether the principles of equity would allow for the
imposition of universal injunctions.192
a. The Notion of Citation
The imposition of universal injunctions violates the principle that
remedies in equity, like remedies in law, must find their root in
precedent.193 Therefore, for a federal court to issue universal injunctions,

187. See generally Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945);
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 309,
318 (1999).
188. See Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 105; Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo
S.A., 527 U.S. at 318.
189. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 105.
190. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A., 527 U.S. at 318 (quoting Atlas Life
Ins. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939)).
191. See supra Section II.A.
192. See supra Sections II.A.1–3.
193. See supra Section II.A.1.

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 260

2/5/21 12:55 PM

2021]

COMMENT

651

a sufficiently analogous grant of equitable power has to have existed in
English courts before the founding, and no such precedent exists.194
There was no precedent in England to enjoining the crown—which
represented the executive—with respect to the interpretation of statutes.195
The closest analog in English law to modern-day universal injunctions was
the “bill of peace,” in which a party might be subject to suit from a group
of parties.196 Even when the Court of Chancery issued bills of peace, the
resulting injunction was considered valid only to the parties involved in
the case and was never considered to extend to the entire world.197 Given
that this is the equitable remedy most analogous to the universal injunction
as it exists today, any assertion that this represents a justification for
universal injunctions is tenuous. Such a conclusion is further buttressed
when considering the manner in which 19th-century courts approached
this question.198 Rather than seeing their role as extending injunctive relief
to nonparties, the courts explicitly repudiated this practice, finding it at
odds with equitable principles and precedents.199 As a result, there is no
basis in equity, as established in Article III, for the imposition of universal
injunctions.
b. Constitutional Restrictions on Remedies in Equity
The Framers of the Constitution created a system of checks and
balances that bind the judiciary to strict precedents governing its
conduct.200 Therefore, it would be peculiar to conclude that such a system
of precedent would allow for a remedy that had no true root in equitable
remedies as they were understood. Any conclusion that the most analogous
remedy to universal injunctions that existed in English equity—the bill of
peace—contemplates such an extension of power is dubious because it
would fundamentally alter the “strict precedents” by which the courts were

194. See generally Bray, supra note 30, at 425–27.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. As discussed above, those courts that were confronted with dispensing
injunctive relief either failed to extend it beyond the parties to the case or rejected
requests to so extend it. See supra Section I.A.2.
199. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117 (1897) (“[W]e do not think
it comports with well-settled principles of equity procedure to include [executive
officers] in an injunction in a suit in which they were not heard or
represented . . . .”).
200. See supra Section II.A.3.
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to be “bound down.”201 Given the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the
extent of general grants of equity includes only those remedies
contemplated by the English Court of Chancery,202 universal injunctions
are a dubious extension of the equitable power of federal courts.203
c. “Neither Force Nor Will . . .”204
Considering that the dispensation of universal injunctions cuts against
any equitable precedents established in England,205 and that the powers
vested in Article III courts do not contemplate their imposition,206 the only
manner in which they might be valid is if the courts have the power to
fashion new remedies. This notion is in conflict with the manifest
restriction that courts have “neither force nor will” but only judgment.207
Reaching beyond vested powers to create new ones—extending the
remedies that Article III courts are entitled to dispense—must be either an
act of will or force, or even both.208 The power of judgment does not itself
vest the ability to create wholly new powers.209 This ability can only be
found in the ability to legislate or to execute the laws.210 Therefore, the
creation and imposition of new remedies—in particular, the universal
201. See supra Section II.A.4.a.
202. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945).
203. See supra Section II.A.3.
204. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
205. See supra Section II.A.4.a.
206. See supra Section II.A.4.b.
207. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
208. Article I of the Constitution provides for a Congress that shall make laws,
while Article II provides for an executive who will take care that Congress’s laws
will be faithfully executed. Creating an otherwise unauthorized remedy is
analogous to first making a law—using the “will” of the legislature—and then
enforcing this law—the force given to the executive to execute laws. See generally
U.S. CONST. arts. I, II.
209. Though the Federalist Papers do not speak in terms of “new powers,” this
conclusion is unavoidable if the terms “force,” “will,” and “judgment” are to
retain their meanings. If creating a new power required only that the courts
“judge” that they had a power they did not previously have, then it becomes
difficult to distinguish force and will—the products of the executive and
legislature—from the judgment of the courts.
210. It is the exclusive purview of Congress to legislate, U.S. CONST. art. I.,
§1, and the power of the executive, as vested in a president of the United States,
to enforce the laws, id. art. II. § 1. The act of legislating—lawmaking—is to “will”
into existence new laws that did not previously exist; the act of carrying out—or
executing the laws—requires the “force” to do so.
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injunction—represents a violation of the separation of powers that are
written into the Constitution.211
B. Judicial Universality
Inherently, universal injunctions impute a power to the courts that
some commentators have named “judicial universality.”212 Judicial
universality is defined as the ability of a court to consider its judgments
applicable not only to the parties present in a given case, but other
similarly situated parties, both present and future.213 Under this theory, the
judgment of a court becomes self-executing for all similarly situated
parties.214 The concept of judicial universality is a recent innovation of the
Supreme Court and is also antithetical to the constitutionally granted
powers of Article III courts.215
1. Origins of Judicial Universality
The notion of judicial universality originates in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cooper v. Aaron.216 The dispute in Cooper involved the Little
Rock School System, which claimed it need not obey the Court’s decision
in Brown v. Board of Education.217 In rejecting the school’s argument, the
Court in Cooper asserted that, per Marbury v. Madison, its interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown was the supreme law of the land,
and Article VI of the Constitution mandated that this interpretation of the
Constitution was binding on all states.218 The Cooper Court never
acknowledged judicial universality with specificity.219 As Justice Breyer
noted, however, the implications of the Court’s decision in Cooper
mandated that judicial universality existed.220 Under judicial universality,
211. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
212. See generally Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myth of Cooper v. Aaron,
137 GEO. L. J. 1135, 1137 (2019).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
217. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (announcing that the
doctrine of “separate but equal” as applied to public education is violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
218. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
219. Blackman, supra note 212, at 1139.
220. Id. (“[T]he Court in Cooper . . . actually decided that the Constitution
obligated other governmental institutions to follow the Court’s interpretations, not
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nonparties to a case do not follow the case’s precedent merely out of a fear
of future litigation.221 Instead, the judgments of the Supreme Court are
self-executing against these individuals.222 Judges and some scholars have
justified this principle, arguing that it stems from the desire to avoid a
“cacophonous Constitution,” replacing it with one in which an
authoritative voice describes the manner in which the Constitution should
be interpreted.223
2. The Judicial Fallacy of Judicial Universality
The notion of judicial universality is in conflict with any historical
understanding of the limits of Article III courts.224 The understood role of
courts before Cooper was that it was the courts’ job to settle disputes
between parties that came before them.225 Furthermore, courts could not
mandate that non-parties to a case had to follow mere principles articulated
by the Court, particularly when the court can—and does—overturn
itself.226 The general premise was that, if a person wished similar treatment
to persons granted relief by the Court, those persons must either be party
to the suit or file their own suit requesting the same relief.227
Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself has shied away from assertions
of judicial universality in the decades since its decision in Cooper.228
Cooper’s coinciding assertion of judicial supremacy—the notion that the
Supreme Court, when it speaks, is uttering the supreme law of the land—
remains a basic principle through which the Court has operated.229 This
stands in sharp contrast to the treatment the Court has given judicial
universality in the years since.230 Though Cooper represented the first of a
number of important civil rights cases before the Court, the doctrine of
judicial universality nevertheless has not found much favor with the
just in the particular case announcing those interpretations, but in similar cases as
well.”).
221. Id. at 1156.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1158.
225. Id. at 1157.
226. Id. at 1158.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1192–93.
229. Id. at 1193.
230. Id. at 1194. Commentators have argued that the Court’s refusal to
reaffirm its validity even in the face of a logical extension of this doctrine speaks
to the shaky ground on which it rests. Id.
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Justices since Cooper.231 This refusal to assert the universality of Supreme
Court decisions, coupled with the lack of historical precedent for this
doctrine, suggests that judicial universality is an inappropriate extension
of judicial power.
3. Extending Judicial Universality to Encompass Universal
Injunctions
Though the dispute concerning judicial universality is primarily
restricted to the Supreme Court, judicial universality is easily analogized
to include the actions of lower courts. Like the Court in Cooper, lower
courts impose injunctions that they deem self-executing against parties
similarly situated but who are not included in the litigation.232 Just as with
the Supreme Court, however, the role of the lower courts is to afford relief
to the litigants before it.233 Certainly, the reasons given for judgment will
establish district or circuit precedent, but those persons who would avail
themselves of this interpretation of law need to present their cases before
the court.234 A failure to file suit means that the court has not passed
judgment on their case or controversy.235 If court judgments cannot be selfexecuting, then a judgment for a plaintiff will never suffice to afford
automatic injunctive relief to nonparties.236 Given that universal
injunctions—by their very nature—impute this power, they necessarily
fall within the false universal power of the judiciary.
C. Ripeness
Ripeness is also an obstacle to the imposition of universal injunctions.
A given dispute is only ripe for judicial review when it is a constitutionally
defined case or controversy.237 Even if a given dispute may be “ripe” for
judicial review, it is a violation of the ripeness principles to extend these
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1011 (E.D.
Cal. 2005); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015);
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 566 (D. Md.
2017). These and other district courts, though presented with a finite group of
plaintiffs, nevertheless found it appropriate to extend injunctive relief to all
similarly situated parties. Id.
233. See generally Blackman, supra note 212, at 1158.
234. See generally id.
235. See generally id.
236. See supra Section II.B.2.
237. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
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holdings to encompass nonparties.238 Thus, a federal court’s imposition of
a universal injunction creates a separate dispute that will never be a “case
or controversy” and therefore can never be ripe.
1. A Brief Overview of Ripeness
Whether an issue is ripe for judicial review hinges on the
Constitution’s restriction on federal courts to hear only cases and
controversies.239 This restriction means that courts are forbidden from
deciding abstract or hypothetical controversies and from giving merely
advisory opinions.240 The Supreme Court noted that Article III courts have
“neither the power to render advisory opinions nor ‘to decide questions
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.’”241 Rather
than issuing advisory opinions, Article III courts must restrict their
judgments to resolving a “real and substantial controversy” that results in
a decree concerning a specific set of facts.242 This restriction bars courts
from deciding what relief might be afforded if given a hypothetical set of
facts.243
2. Universal Injunctions Are Never “Ripe”
Based on the Supreme Court’s guidelines concerning ripeness, it is
difficult to square the universal injunction as an adequate remedy with this
doctrine. The Court has asserted that the cases-and-controversies
requirement inherently means that courts should refrain from deciding
issues that do not affect the litigants before them.244 The imposition of a
universal injunction necessarily makes such a decision.245
For the vast majority of cases in which universal injunctions are the
remedy, the ripeness analysis can be broken down into two questions. The
first question the court must answer is whether the conduct of the
238. See infra Section II.C.2.
239. See Flast, 398 U.S. at 94.
240. Id. at 96.
241. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. The substance of any universal injunction will certainly grant relief to the
parties before the court. The unique feature of universally applicable injunctive
relief is its ability to affect parties not before the court. As a result, it is correct to
say that universal injunctions do not affect only the litigants in a given case or
controversy. See Wasserman, supra note 86.

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 266

2/5/21 12:55 PM

2021]

COMMENT

657

executive toward the plaintiff represents a violation of that plaintiff’s
rights under statute or the Constitution.246 The second necessary inquiry is
whether said conduct merits enjoining the executive to all other similarly
situated parties.247 The answer to the first question will depend solely on
the facts of the case at hand: if the executive’s conduct or a passed
regulation created a harm, then the case is certainly ripe.248
The second question, however, seems to present a less nuanced line of
discussion. None of the “similarly situated parties” are before the court,
and none of them have seen fit to file suit. This seems to represent a wholly
separate issue from the first question, itself possibly representing a “case
or controversy.”249 In the case of the second inquiry, however, given that
these similarly situated parties were not brought before the court, any
holding concerning them is correctly considered merely advisory.250 This
characteristic of these opinions concerning relief puts them squarely
outside of any accepted principle of ripeness.
Universal injunctions are vulnerable to criticism on a number of legal
grounds. They involve the creation of a new equitable remedy, a power
which the Constitution does not authorize; they create self-executing
judgments, which also fall outside of the constitutional powers of Article

246. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D.
Cal. 2005). As the court notes, the original suit specifically concerned the Burnt
Ridge Project Timber Sale instituted by the Forest Service.
247. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (noting that the duty
of the judiciary is “ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the
controversy” and “the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment,
which otherwise would stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal right”). The
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this part of the analysis as separate and
has noted that injunctive relief can only apply where a justiciable issue exists, but
not simply where there is an illegal law. Id.
248. Requiring that an issue be ripe is designed to keep the court from
rendering merely advisory opinions and to restrict it to only cases and
controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. If a concrete set of facts is before a court,
it is necessarily not rendering an advisory opinion if a harm is alleged. Id.
249. See generally Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488. As the Mellon Court noted, such
a “case or controversy” would remain only a question of public policy rather than
a justiciable issue.
250. The Supreme Court has defined advisory opinions as those that concern
a hypothetical set of facts not before the court. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S.
395, 401 (1975). However, the only set of facts the court can possibly know to be
actual are the facts of the parties before it. Therefore, any alleged harm occurring
to non-parties can only be considered as hypothetical, particularly for those who
have yet to be injured by the defective rule or statute. See generally id.
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III courts; and they necessarily cause courts to provide advisory opinions,
thus violating the Constitution’s cases-or-controversies limitation.
III. UNIVERSAL INJUNCTIONS: A BAD POLICY
Universal injunctions, beyond their legal defects, suffer from several
difficulties in light of traditional policy considerations surrounding the
judiciary and the manner in which it fulfills its constitutional
responsibilities. Though not binding on Article III tribunals, these
considerations have functioned to channel the judiciary’s operations
throughout the history of the country and should not be offended lightly.
In particular, universal injunctions encourage forum shopping that is
deleterious to the functioning and legitimacy of federal courts, overturn
the precedent model, and halt percolation of complex legal issues through
the courts.251
A. Incentivizing Forum Shopping
The universal injunction affects many persons who are not parties to
a given suit, and this aspect of universal injunctions creates an incentive
for plaintiffs to forum shop.252 Though doubtless an appealing proposition
for advocates, the U.S. system of justice is still tasked with reaching its
own conclusions surrounding the effects of forum shopping.
1. “Shop ‘Til the Statute Drops”253
With the rise in popularity of universal injunctions, plaintiffs now
routinely seek out courts which might enjoin certain presidential
administrations from carrying out their selected policies.254 During the
Bush Administration, plaintiffs turned to Ninth Circuit courts—
particularly those in California—to seek universal injunctions, which
251. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
252. EMC Corp. v. Parallel Iron, LLC, 914 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (D. Mass.
2012). Forum shopping occurs when plaintiffs select a forum that has little factual
relevance to their actions. In the context of universal injunctions, plaintiffs might
forum shop if, for example, they are convinced a certain court is more probable
to grant relief than another. Id.
253. Bray, supra note 30, at 460.
254. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1011 (E.D.
Cal. 2005); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015); E.
Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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blocked issues such as proposed forest regulations.255 During the Obama
Administration, the focus switched to courts in Texas, which enjoined
policies such as the following: the President’s DAPA program,256 a
department regulation known as the “persuader rule,”257 issues concerning
the statutory use of the word “sex,”258 and the enforcement of a
Department of Labor regulation that would have given overtime pay to
many workers.259 Once President Trump took office in 2017, the focus
switched back to less conservative circuits, such as the Fourth, Seventh,
and Ninth, where courts enjoined the Administration from implementing
its proposed “travel ban,”260 policies governing so-called “sanctuary
cities,”261 and cease-and-desist immigration proceedings.262 Plaintiffs
brought these proceedings in courts with ideologies that favored the
imposition of the injunction.263 Moreover, in many of the proceedings, it
is almost impossible to argue that jurisdiction could not have been found
in other states.264
2. Why Not Forum Shop?
Forum shopping is a useful practice for any advocate seeking the most
favorable relief for his client.265 However, the considerations of individual
advocates do not answer the question of whether the justice system as a
whole should be concerned about the effects of the practice.

255. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
256. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 604.
257. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 WL
3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
258. Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 835–36 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
259. Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 533–34 (E.D. Tex.
2016).
260. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-014JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 3, 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, F265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160 (D. Haw. 2017); Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017).
261. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
262. Nw. Immigr. Rts. Project v. Sessions, No. C17-716RAJ, 2017 WL
3189032, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2017).
263. Bray, supra note 30, at 460.
264. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex.
2015); see also Bray, supra note 30, at 460 (arguing that “[t]he forum selection
happens not only for the district court, but also for the appellate court”).
265. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71
FLA. L. REV. 979, 1013 (2019). At least one commentator has noted, “There is
nothing inherently suspect about forum shopping.” Id.
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Those who forum shop for the benefit of obtaining specific remedies
prevent other more appropriate courts from hearing their case on the theory
that those courts might be less likely to grant them the relief requested.266
For example, though 26 states were involved in the DAPA dispute, Texas
was selected as a forum, likely because of the conservative tendencies of
the Fifth Circuit.267 Today, federal courts often find themselves under fire
for ruling based on ideologies rather than on the law. Commentators have
described the Supreme Court as everything from “liberal” during the
Warren years,268 to “conservative” during the Rehnquist and Roberts
years.269 If one court is unlikely to grant sweeping relief that another
would, it becomes more likely that such rulings are made out of an
ideological decision.270 Encouraging judges to bring their ideologies to the
forefront is inappropriate in the face of obtaining actual justice.271 Forum
shopping itself would not be eliminated with the ban of universal
injunctions. In cases that involve universal injunctions, however, because
of the limited relief that would be granted, the harm is not nearly so
deleterious. The effects of percolation will, at least in theory, tend to defeat
ideologically driven precedent.272 Forum shopping will cut off this process
before it can occur if the court into which the litigation was forum-shopped
can enjoin the executive with regard to all similarly situated parties.

266. Predominantly conservative circuits might be less willing to set aside—
or give broad relief concerning—activities of conservative presidents. Likewise,
more liberal circuits and courts may act similarly with respect to more liberal
administrations.
267. See generally Bray, supra note 30, at 459–60.
268. See, e.g., Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War:
The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 65–66 (1998).
269. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Decision-Making
Trends of the Rehnquist Court Era: Civil Rights and Liberties Cases, 89
JUDICATURE 161, 162 (2005).
270. See Belknap, supra note 268. If, for example, it is true that Justices on the
Warren Court sometimes wrote whole opinions without any eye to the
Constitution, any ruling or relief they granted could easily have stemmed from
ideological preferences rather than from a correct application of the law. See id.
271. See Kennedy, supra note 149, at 614. Even when courts of equity were
permitted to go beyond the written law, it was these very appeals to conscience
and personal ideologies that were harshly criticized and ultimately disallowed in
equity courts. See id.
272. See infra Section III.B.
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B. Universal Injunctions and the Absence of Percolation
Universal injunctions vastly limit the ability of disputes challenging
executive action from percolating through the federal courts.273
Percolation is an important vessel through which constitutional
interpretation is concluded at the Supreme Court; thus, federal courts
should preserve this process whenever possible.
1. Percolation in the U.S. Judicial System
The hierarchical design of the federal courts facilitates percolation.274
As questions of statutory and constitutional interpretation are brought in
differing district courts, courts give differing conclusions and reasons for
those conclusions.275 These interpretations are further refined or clarified
through the appellate process.276 Assuming the Supreme Court ultimately
grants certiorari to resolve a dispute, the Court will have the ability to view
several alternatives concerning the correct resolution for the dispute and
can synthesize the best answer.277
Percolation allows the synthesis of diverse opinions on complex
statutory and constitutional disputes.278 Through the percolation process,
federal courts can benefit from the wide diversity of backgrounds and
skills among judges.279 Moreover, percolation creates the ability for lower
courts to respond to other decisions and thus further refine the analysis
concerning difficult constitutional and statutory issues.280 Whenever
judges sitting on different courts converge on a single argument, much less
doubt arises concerning the correctness of these judicial conclusions.281
Percolation serves a particularly crucial purpose in constitutional
disputes because, unlike statutory disputes, Congress cannot simply step
in to correct the Supreme Court’s decision if they find it erroneous.282
273. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
274. See generally Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit
Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 457, 481
(2012).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 482–83.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 483.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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Whenever Congress may find a court’s interpretation of a statute to be at
odds with its legislative intent, it can draft around—and thus supersede—
the interpretation in question.283 Such a process does not exist regarding
constitutional decisions.284 Moreover, given that the process of amending
the Constitution is extremely difficult and resource-intensive,285 the
Supreme Court is in the best position to rule on difficult questions of
interpretation when it has been provided with the most thought on them.286
These considerations make percolation an indispensable process for wellinformed judicial decision-making.
2. Universal Injunctions: A Stagnation of the Percolation Process
The imposition of universal injunctions severely impacts this
percolation process in two ways. First, the Supreme Court is presented
with only one interpretation of the law when it takes up a question of
constitutionality. If other courts give deference to the court issuing the
injunction,287 they will not themselves embark on any examination of the
reasons for such an injunction; thus, the Court will be presented with no
competing opinions for consideration. Second, because such injunctions
invariably freeze further litigation on other fact patterns implicated by the
decision, the Supreme Court’s consideration of the disputed law’s validity
is necessarily restricted to a single fact pattern.288 This stagnation prevents
the Court from making well-reasoned and informed decisions about the
most correct interpretation of the Constitution or statute.

283. See U.S. CONST. art. V. If Congress disagrees with the interpretation of a
particular statute, they can clarify the statute by redrafting it to incorporate their
intent. The Constitution, however, is not subject to redrafting in this way. Id.
284. See id.
285. Id. To amend the Constitution, two-thirds of both houses of Congress
must propose the amendment, or two-thirds of the state legislatures must call for
a convention of states. For an amendment to be ratified, three-fourths of the
legislatures of the states must agree on it or, if it is a convention of states, threefourths of the states must agree. Id.
286. Gewirtzman, supra note 274, at 483; see also U.S. CONST. art. V.
287. Without a court of differing territorial jurisdiction deferring to universal
injunctions, they would be of no real value as they, by definition, subject the
executive to injunctive relief against all parties who are similarly situated.
288. In cases where universal injunctions were issued, the only set of facts that
the Court can consider is the one which ultimately led to the universal injunction.
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C. Overturning the Precedent Model
For the majority of the history of Article III courts, the precedent
model has also served a crucial role in well-reasoned rulings on the proper
interpretations of statutes and the Constitution.289 As with percolation,
universal injunctions severely inhibit this process because the injunctions
allow lower courts to supersede the Supreme Court as the tribunal through
which nationally binding precedent is set.
1. Background and Constitutional Basis
The precedent model and its importance in judicial decision-making
originate from how common law courts generally reach conclusions of
law. Through this model, lower courts identify relevant legal authority,
and then apply it to the facts at hand to reach a decision.290 In practice, this
approach means that lower courts will use Supreme Court decisions as
their primary authority and then apply methods of common law
interpretation to fit them to the case at hand.291 This model envisions lower
judges as “infantry carrying out the marching orders of generals who sit
on the court of last resort.”292
The rationale for this approach to judicial decision-making stems from
the text of the Constitution.293 The Constitution vests judicial power in
“one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”294 The Constitution further clarifies the
nature of those courts that can exist outside of the Supreme Court.295
Article I gives Congress explicit power to create tribunals “inferior to the
[S]upreme Court.”296 This approach creates what scholars have described
as a “principal-agent” relationship among the courts, with the Supreme
Court—the principal—at the top of the judicial hierarchy, as the only court
that the Constitution created.297 Within this framework, the Supreme

289. See Gewirtzman, supra note 274, at 465.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges
and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 848 (1993).
293. Gewirtzman, supra note 274, at 467.
294. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
295. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
296. Id.
297. Gewirtzman, supra note 274, at 467.
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Court—the principal—is the director of the manner in which the lower
courts—its agents—perform certain tasks and reach certain outcomes.298
2. Universal Injunctions and the End of the Principal-Agent
Relationship
Whereas courts may have been beholden to the Supreme Court in
years past for binding precedents nationwide, universal injunctions, if
followed by other courts, replace this precedent model with a precedent
model guided by lower courts that does not comport with the “inferior”
nature of lower courts.299 Whereas the Supreme Court in past cases would
be the tribunal in which nationally binding decisions were made, the
imposition of universal injunctions necessarily relocates this power to
lower courts.300 This does not suggest that the Supreme Court should be
allowed to issue universal injunctions. Such a dispute is immaterial to this
discussion because this Comment does not seek to overturn the wellestablished rule that Supreme Court precedents are binding on lower
courts.301 If the Court reaches a conclusion on a question of statutory
interpretation, even if such a judgment cannot be self-executing on
nonparties, as future cases arise, lower courts will be bound to follow these
precedents.

298. Id.
299. The Constitution references this inferiority in two provisions. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”); id. art. I., § 8, cl. 9 (“The Congress shall have the
Power . . . [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”).
300. It is important to note that this discussion does not suggest that other
lower courts would not be found to enforce injunctive relief against specific
parties. Rather, what is questioned is the validity of one district or circuit court
imposing an injunction which must be followed when other courts hear new cases
concerning the same disputed statute or regulation.
301. See C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme
Court’s Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV.
39, 83 (1990) (“A lower court clearly violates its duty of allegiance to the Supreme
Court when . . . it rejects a precedent that the Supreme Court has not
questioned.”).
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IV. COULD UNIVERSAL INJUNCTIONS EVER BE APPROPRIATE?
In their imposition of these injunctions, lower courts have routinely
provided justifications for their use.302 Some of these justifications provide
compelling insights into the rationale behind imposing universal
injunctions. In particular, courts have found authority to issue universal
injunctions through analogies with their powers of judicial review over
acts of Congress, through their search for uniform policies, and through
their conclusion that no narrower remedy exists to provide relief to the
plaintiffs.
A. Following Precedent in Cases “of Essentially Similar Character”
In its 1963 Wirtz decision, the D.C. Circuit was a pioneer in
advocating for the imposition of universal injunctions.303 One argument
the D.C. Circuit used in Wirtz to justify its universal injunction tracked the
reasoning used in Cooper v. Aaron.304 The D.C. Circuit noted that “the
principles announced by the court—at least if it is the Supreme Court
which speaks—should be followed by the administrator in all cases of
essentially similar character.”305 Further, the court noted that when lower
courts are presented with similar causes of action, they will tend to provide
the same relief to any individual who brings such a cause of action against
the administrator.306
The logic of the first claim the D.C. Circuit made in Wirtz—that the
administrator should always follow Supreme Court precedent—is likely
based on Cooper v. Aaron and its assertion of judicial universality.307
Moreover, even in the absence of judicial universality, it is undoubtedly
prudent for the executive to follow Supreme Court precedent once it is
set.308 Should the executive fail to do so, any district court is likely to find

302. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 534–38 (D.C. Cir.
1963); State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160 (D. Haw. 2017).
303. For a discussion of the Wirtz decision and its significance, see supra
Section I.B.1.
304. Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 535.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. This principle echoes the notion of judicial universality that the Court first
announced in Cooper. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
308. This executive prudence has represented the backdrop against which
courts have issued opinions on the constitutionality of laws and acts since
America’s founding. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117 (1897).
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in favor of a plaintiff whom the court finds injured as a result of the same
defective statute or regulation.
The Wirtz court’s analysis is lacking, however, on how this applies to
lower courts. Indeed, lower courts are likely to grant the same relief to all
individuals with a similar cause of action.309 However, this approach to
decision-making rejects the imposition of a universal injunction. If lower
courts are left to give similar relief to causes of action with essentially
similar character, then no court has enjoined the executive from taking this
action. Had a court imposed such an injunction, there would remain no
reason for the court to act beyond ordering the executive to obey the
previous judicial decree.310 Moreover, a different court may, in viewing
the same fact pattern, conclude differently as to the merits of a question of
law.311 If this is true, it is prudent to allow courts to reach their own
conclusions on questions of law and to not handcuff courts with
extraterritorial universal injunctions.312
B. Analogies to Judicial Review over Acts of Congress
The most compelling case that the Wirtz court made regarding the
appropriateness of universally enjoining the executive relates to the
manner in which courts interpret congressional statutes.313 The court
analogized the regulation in controversy to a congressional statute, noting
that had Congress passed such a statute, and had that congressional statute
been held unconstitutional, then “there is no doubt that it would
necessarily be regarded as unconstitutional as to all persons similarly
situated, and not merely as to those who brought the suit attacking it.” 314
Any federal court—certainly the Supreme Court, if not inferior courts—
can, if suit is correctly brought, declare an act of Congress

309. Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 535.
310. See Wasserman, supra note 86, at 350. The nature of the federal judiciary
is that injunctions that one court imposes can be brought by the party who is
benefited to any other court to order that it be followed. Id.
311. See supra Section III.A.
312. See supra Section III.C.1. This distinction is important because, if a
higher court speaks concerning the correct interpretation of a statute or regulation,
then the precedent model dictates that the lower court follow this decision.
313. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 178 (1803) (“If then the
courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.”).
314. Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 534.
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unconstitutional.315 Whether this power is found in Article III tribunals
depends upon the extent of the power of judicial review and how this
power is applied to universal injunctions.
1. The Power of Judicial Review: Writ of Erasure, or Constitutional
Supremacy?
The Court’s landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison established the
principle of judicial review.316 However, the manner in which this “duty
of the judicial department,”317 is to be expounded may not be as obvious.
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Marshall noted that when there existed
a conflict between a statute and the Constitution, then Article III courts are
bound to decide the case on the Constitution, rather than on the
constitutionally-defective statute.318 Understood in this light, the power of
judicial review requires courts to decide all cases with an eye to the
Constitution before any statute is considered.319 This power does not vest
Article III courts with the equivalent of a veto pen, whereby they can
remove defective statutes or regulations from the books.320 Thus, the
Supreme Court, and lower courts alike, when presented with such a statute,
should simply refuse to enforce it.321 In this way, judicial review provides
315. See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) at 180 (finding that “the particular
phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle . . . that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument”).
316. See id.
317. Id. at 177.
318. Id. at 178.
319. Id.
320. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (“[The power of
the judiciary] amounts to little more than the negative power to disregard an
unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the
enforcement of a legal right.”); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Of course, a favorable
declaratory judgment . . . cannot make even an unconstitutional statute
disappear.”); Wisness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727, 728 (10th Cir. 2006) (“There is
no procedure in American law for courts or other agencies of government—other
than the legislature itself—to purge from the statute books, laws that conflict with
the Constitution as interpreted by the courts.”).
321. The history of the judiciary’s power over statutes as opposed to the
Constitution shows that there were genuine disputes over how much power should
be vested in Article III tribunals. Some delegates favored Marbury-style judicial
review; others did favor an executive-style veto over such statutes. Ultimately,
although several influential framers pushed for such a power, it was rejected. See
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for constitutional supremacy, whereby the Constitution is the primary
source of law in federal court and must always supersede when a statute
or action of the government is constitutionally defective.
2. Universal Injunctions and Constitutional Supremacy
The D.C. Circuit’s analogy to the powers that Article III tribunals have
over legislation is a wholly inadequate justification for universal
injunctions.322 Should a court find any action of the executive defective
when applied to a governing statute or, ultimately, to the Constitution,
courts have the power to refuse to enforce it.323 This approach does not
suggest the validity of universal injunctions, which by their nature purport
to apply as a kind of veto to the statute or regulation.324 Rather, this process
follows the more typical precedent model, wherein a decision that finds an
act or regulation constitutionally void is simply applied to each individual
case or controversy that the court may hear in the future.325 This approach
to judicial review comes with the advantage of allowing a court to overturn
previous findings of unconstitutionality if it feels the need to do so without
concerning itself with the scope of injunctive relief it needs to use beyond
the case at hand.
C. Promoting Uniform Policy
Universal injunctions can serve the important function of promoting
uniform policy.326 Many areas of the government, particularly in the
administrative field, are best served by a single, uniform rule or policy, so
Jonathon L. F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 954–
59 (2018).
322. See Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
323. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) at 178 (1803).
324. Courts have admitted as much in their imposition of universal injunctions.
See, e.g., Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 534. There the court argued that the language of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553, required the court to hold unlawful and set aside agency
actions found to be invalid. The D.C. Circuit clearly viewed “setting aside”
agency action as striking down the regulation itself, not just the controversy before
the court. In that way, the universal injunction contemplated amounted to a kind
of veto of the regulation.
325. See supra Section III.C.
326. This “uniform policy” consideration was a core justification for both the
Wirtz and East Bay Sanctuary Covenant courts. For the D.C. Circuit, the
consideration was against providing bargaining advantages to the plaintiffs; for
the Ninth Circuit, it was a uniform immigration policy. Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 534; E.
Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018).
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that parties similarly situated do not find themselves treated differently in
different circumstances.327 For example, when the Wirtz court
acknowledged that a universal injunction might be warranted, it noted that
failing to enjoin the executive with respect to the entire electric motors
industry could give an “unconscionable bargaining advantage” over its
competitors.328 Such considerations of uniform policy are hardly restricted
to use in the electric motor industry. In imposing universal injunctions
concerning immigration policy, courts have routinely argued that one
important focus of the executive must be a uniform immigration policy.329
However, courts are prohibited from involving themselves in
questions of policy when such questions are unnecessary to address.330
Lower courts may find that certain parts of statutes or regulations are
violative of controlling legal authority, such as the Constitution or a
governing statute for an administrative agency.331 However, this decision
should extend only so far as to involve the case disputed. Questions of
policy are questions reserved to either the legislature or the executive.332
Should the Supreme Court deem the law too harmful to policy concerns,
it can establish nationally binding precedent to this end.333

327. See, e.g., Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 534. It is logical to believe that a company
that is not burdened with regulations fixing its wages will have a bargaining
advantage compared with those that do.
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015)
(noting the Constitution’s requirements for uniform naturalization and that
Congress’s instruction that the immigration laws of the United States should be
uniformly enforced); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec.,
908 F.3d 476, 511 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 701
(9th Cir. 2017)) (noting the need for a uniform immigration policy).
330. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The “political
questions” to which Justice Brennan refers are essentially questions of policy, in
particular policy decisions in which the courts should refuse to intervene because
of separation of powers.
331. This power is a logical extension of the power of the judicial department
to “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177–78
(1803).
332. The Supreme Court refers to this non-delegation of power to Article III
as a “political question.” Political questions are by their nature nonjusticiable,
meaning that federal courts have no ability to question or reverse them. See Baker,
369 U.S. at 209.
333. Such is readily contemplated by the precedent model of judicial decision
making. Lower courts, as the “agents” of the Supreme Court, would be bound to
follow the Court’s precedents. See Gewirtzman, supra note 274, at 467.
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D. No Other Remedy?
In some cases, universal injunctive relief is the only viable remedy.334
Consider, for instance, the case of East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v.
Trump.335 The reasoning the Ninth Circuit articulated is justifiable.336 The
plaintiffs were not the asylum seekers themselves, and thus there was truly
no manner in which relief could be granted without enjoining the executive
with respect to all asylum seekers.337 The nature of an injunction tailored
to only an NGO would certainly be complicated. One possibility might be
that asylum seekers would fall under the purview of the injunction only if
the NGO represented them, but this would be a strange approach to
equitable relief. Under this approach, a party is subject to an injunction
brought by another party when they become represented by that other party
but not otherwise. In other words, the executive is compelled to follow a
different law based not on the status of an asylum seeker but rather on who
represents that asylum seeker. Under this hypothetical injunction, a party’s
relief would not truly be based on whether their rights were violated but
on whether they were represented by East Bay Sanctuary Covenant. Given
that the court’s decision is based not on the representation of the person,
but on the defective nature of the law, this injunction would be inconsistent
with the court’s reasons for judgment.338
The issue is not that courts need to invent new forms of equitable relief
to satisfy different perceptions of their role; rather, courts should be
cautious of extending their power when such an extension mandates such
judicial inventions. For example, the Ninth Circuit only found standing for
the NGO in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant by applying what is known as
“organizational standing.”339 Organizational standing, courts have held,
can be established if the defendant’s practices have impaired the

334. See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 868
(N.D. Cal. 2018).
335. Id.
336. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018).
337. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, as an NGO that represents and advocates
for asylum-seekers, is not itself seeking asylum. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant,
349 F. Supp. 3d at 868.
338. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 769–79.
339. See id. at 765. Even before the Ninth Circuit established its own
parameters, in Sierra Club v. Morton the Supreme Court tacitly suggested that
organizations might be able to bring suit, though such a suit required “special
interest” in the subject before the court. Sierra Club v. Morton, 406 U.S. 727, 739–
40 (1972).
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organization in providing the services they were formed to provide.340 The
Ninth Circuit used its own precedent to conclude that an organization can
satisfy this test by a showing that the organization, because of a challenged
policy, needed to expend resources in ways that they would otherwise not
need to expend.341
The difficulty with broad standing requirements that grant
organizations the right to sue on behalf of their members is that it hinges
on a remedy that is dubious at best.342 As in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant,
where the NGO was itself demanding relief, the universal injunction
would be the only remedy that could grant full redress of the alleged
injury.343 In its 1992 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme
Court articulated the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III
standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact; (2) the
injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) it must
be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the
court.344 Where a universal injunction is the only manner of relief, it
becomes difficult to argue that it is likely that a court can redress the
alleged injury because, as discussed previously, universal injunctions have
several legal and policy defects that should disqualify them as a proper
remedy.345 In this way, the third element of Lujan standing could never be
satisfied where the court must impose a universal injunction.346
This admonition against inventing new doctrines of standing does not
mean that courts can—or should be—blind to the need to flesh out the
requirements for standing or any other equally opaque doctrine of law.
However, courts should exercise caution in this extension of judicial
power. Where the Supreme Court has articulated constitutional minima
that conflict with the new doctrine, that doctrine cannot be a valid
extension of judicial power.347 Where the remedy a court must impose—

340. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 765.
341. Id.
342. In this case, the Ninth Circuit demanded a universal injunction because,
by its own admission, there was no narrower remedy which would be adequate.
Id. at 779–80.
343. See id.
344. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
345. See supra Parts II, III.
346. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1987)) (“[I]t must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”).
347. See supra Section III.C. The lower courts act as “agents” of the
“principal” that is the Supreme Court. Where the principal has mandated action
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here, the universal injunction—is without sound legal basis,348 and has
even been repudiated in part by the Supreme Court,349 it is incorrect to
extend standing to encompass these cases.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSAL INJUNCTION
In weighing the evidence of the nature and history of the judicial
function,350 the implications for executive and judicial policy,351 and courtmade arguments that are put forward to validate the universal
injunction,352 the universal injunction proves a dubious equitable remedy.
Two solutions present themselves for consideration. The most ideal
remedy is the plaintiff-specific injunction, which effectively returns the
limits of injunctive relief to those recognized before the Wirtz court.353
Should such a severe limitation on injunctive relief be seen as
nonbeneficial, a middle-ground approach is the court-specific injunction.
A. Plaintiff-Specific Injunctions
The most ideal approach to remedying the issue of universal
injunctions is the plaintiff-specific injunction, which would simply return
courts to a traditional limitation concerning equitable remedies. This type
of injunctive relief returns federal courts to the historical precedent that
allowed courts to enjoin only the parties before them.354 In other words,
the injunctive relief is only applicable to the plaintiff or plaintiffs before
the court.355 Any future parties concerning the challenged rule cannot be
subject to the injunction, but the court’s judgment will operate as
established precedent on the issue. In addition, the court will be able to
fine-tune the relief it affords if this is necessary. Fact patterns are rarely
identical from case to case; thus, some variation on the extent of the
injunctive relief may be prudent.
These injunctions do not suffer from the defects of the universal
injunction scheme. They comport with traditional understandings of
that conflicts with the action the agents have taken, the agents cannot supersede
that action.
348. See supra Part II.
349. See Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 107 (1897).
350. See supra Part II.
351. See supra Part III.
352. See supra Part IV.
353. See supra Section I.A.2.
354. See supra Section I.A.2.
355. See supra Section I.A.2.
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equity in that the Court of Chancery in England readily contemplated
injunctive relief.356 They do not implicate judicial universality in any way
because, by their very nature, they apply only to the parties before the
court.357 They raise no questions of whether an advisory opinion is being
sought, because injunctive relief to a particular plaintiff represents the
redress of a particular injury.358 They provide a minimal incentive for
forum shopping, as the court’s opinion, no matter how ideology-driven,
can do no more than set precedent for future litigation.359 They provide for
the continued percolation of difficult questions of constitutional and
statutory interpretation because injunctive relief that is party-specific does
not implicate setting any nationally binding precedent.360 Finally, they
maintain the precedent model of judicial decision-making in that courts
will first look to the Supreme Court before looking to other courts that
provide individualized injunctive relief.361
The primary objection to the plaintiff-specific approach is the inequity
it is likely to visit on other similarly situated parties. As the Wirtz court
noted, the failure to enjoin the executive beyond the parties of a case may
result in negative consequences that reach beyond the courtroom.362 In
particular, for the D.C. Circuit, unconscionable bargaining advantages
might result if only one company in an industry is not subject to an
unlawful fixing of wages.363 The other companies could bring their cases
before the D.C. District Court, at which time they would likely be
vindicated by the court’s precedent. In the meantime, however, they would
be subject to the unfair practices just mentioned. Additionally, more
poorly situated companies, for example those with poor finances, might
find it more troublesome to go to court.
The only way to overcome this hurdle is for the executive to comport
his behavior to comply with court precedents. Rather than take up the
alleged Jacksonian mantle of belligerent noncompliance with the courts,
the executive should be willing to accept Chief Justice Marshall’s famous
quote from Marbury v. Madison: “It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”364 So long as the
Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, two choices exist when
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
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Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Id.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
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established precedent is repugnant to the executive: it can request an
appeal to the higher court, or it can attempt to persuade a different court
of the merits of its arguments. If it is the Supreme Court that has spoken,
then the executive remains capable of requesting a rehearing or, if another
similar dispute arises, the executive can try to convince the Court of its
error.
B. Court-Specific Injunctions
A middle-ground approach to universal injunctions is to limit the
scope of any injunctive relief to only the court that issues it. These
injunctions would reach beyond the plaintiffs before the court, but the
executive would be subject to the injunction only so far as that particular
court has jurisdiction. This approach provides a more inviting approach
for those who may not be comfortable with the comparatively harsh limits
on plaintiff-specific injunctions. If one does not subscribe in full to the
legal and policy considerations discussed in Parts II and III, or agrees with
at least one of the possible cases made in Part IV, his or her acceptance of
plaintiff-specific injunctions is likely qualified at best.
In either case, these injunctions at least somewhat coincide with the
discussion points in this Comment. They are less violative of equity norms
in that they limit the “who” to which the injunction will apply.365 They do
not import universality to the decisions of lower courts, as these
injunctions will have no effect on parties outside of the issuing court’s
jurisdiction.366 They restrict advisory opinions in their scope, as these
opinions will not apply to other courts.367 They can never affect plaintiffs
outside of the court into which the case was forum shopped.368 They still
allow for percolation because the issues will need to be relitigated in other
courts before injunctive relief will apply.369 Finally, they retain the
precedent model insofar as the court that issued the injunction does not set
the national precedent.370
Moreover, courts have already expressed a willingness to adapt this
comparatively limited version of injunction.371 In East Bay Covenant v.
Barr, the Ninth Circuit considered the stay of a TRO that the Northern
365. See supra Section II.A; see also supra Section I.B.2.
366. See generally supra Section II.B.
367. See generally supra Section II.C.
368. See generally supra Section III.A.
369. See generally supra Section II.B.
370. See generally Section III.C.
371. See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th
Cir. 2019).

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 284

2/5/21 12:55 PM

2021]

COMMENT

675

District of California granted concerning a new regulation on asylum.372
The regulation mandated that asylum seekers first apply for asylum in a
country through which they passed before crossing the southern border.373
Concluding this regulation violated certain provisions of the APA, the
Northern District imposed a TRO that put a universal stay on its use.374
The Ninth Circuit took up appeal of this case and granted a stay of the
Northern District’s TRO in so far is at extended beyond the Ninth Circuit,
concluding that the nationwide scope of the injunction “is not supported
by the record as it stands.”375 As a result, the Ninth Circuit effectively
issued the exact kind of injunction discussed here, in that the injunctive
relief reached no further than the courts within that circuit. This apparent
willingness by courts to already consider narrowing the scope of some
injunctions makes the court-specific injunction an appealing alternative to
the universal injunction.376
Even as the court-specific injunction might assuage those not
comfortable with plaintiff-specific injunctions, it does create a different
problem, in that it is not immediately apparent to whom court-specific
injunctions will apply. Court-specific injunctions would certainly apply to
parties within the traditional territorial limits of the circuit. For example,
were the Southern District of Texas to issue a court-specific injunction,
that injunction would only apply within the territorial limits of the district.
Were the Fifth Circuit to issue such an injunction, those parties in Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi would automatically fall under its purview. For
those parties who have forum shopped their way into a particular court,
however, it is not apparent whether the injunctive relief would apply to
them. If it does, the question becomes what point in time the injunction
applies. If it finds the executive disobeying an injunction, a court might
contemplate contempt charges.377 It is difficult to imagine how the
executive could foresee the whole group of persons who might find their

372. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 960 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
373. Id. at 929.
374. Id. at 960.
375. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 934 F.3d at 1028.
376. The necessity to discuss and circumscribe the imposition of the courtspecific injunction remains important even though in some cases, courts are
willing to use it now. This is because presently, their imposition is not anything
more than judicial discretion; there are no standards for its imposition.
377. See, e.g., Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1799 (2019) (discussing
when a creditor might be held in civil contempt for violating an injunction for
bankruptcy discharge).
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way into a given court in the future. Given this, holding the executive in
contempt might be considered an unfair use of the judiciary’s power.
The answer to this hurdle is rooted directly in the existing rules of civil
procedure and practices of the courts.378 First, it is stated explicitly that
federal courts have jurisdiction in cases where the federal government is a
defendant.379 Once the basic question of jurisdiction is established, the
next inquiry is where proper venue can be laid to try a case.380 Title 28 also
provides the answer to this question, and it provides specific provisions
for where officers of the government can be sued.381 These rules together
provide a framework whereby courts can always determine where
jurisdiction and venue are proper and can provide in-depth reasons for
their decisions. As such, the most logical manner to overcome the
uncertainty of the scope of a court-specific injunction is to withhold
injunctive relief from the plaintiff until such time as proper jurisdiction
and venue are found. Once the court has found jurisdiction and venue, the
executive will have no argument that it was not on notice of the
applicability of the injunction to a prospective plaintiff. Once this notice
has been given, the executive becomes subject to this injunction as well as
any contempt proceedings that might arise from failing to follow it.382
C. The Case for Preferring the Court-Specific Injunction
The plaintiff-specific injunction is by far the best solution: it avoids
any possibility of judicial universality; it comports with equity; and it
should never violate basic principles of ripeness. For some, however, the
Supreme Court’s assertion of its power in Cooper may be a logical
extension of judicial power, and thus some level of judicial universality is
appropriate. Moreover, the only manner in which the major hurdle to
plaintiff-specific injunctions—the disparate treatment of parties not
subject to the injunctive relief—involves a level of faith in the executive
that judges may not have. In contrast, the primary hurdle to court-specific
injunctions—the uncertainty of those parties to which the injunction might
apply—admits a comparatively simple remedy, in that once it has been put
378. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1346, 1367, 1391.
379. Id. § 1346.
380. See generally id. § 1391.
381. Id. § 1391(e)(1). District courts can hear cases in which a defendant is an
officer of the federal government if the defendant resides in that district; a
substantial portion of the conduct was involved in that state; or, if no real property
is involved, the district where the plaintiff resides.
382. For an example of contempt charges for violating an injunction, see
Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1799.
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on proper notice, the executive has no reason to assert that a given plaintiff
is subject to injunctive relief. Given these considerations, the best remedy
to this problem is to shrink the universe of injunctive relief to those
plaintiffs over which a court can find proper jurisdiction and venue, after
the executive has been put on notice of these findings.
CONCLUSION
Universal injunctions suffer from several defects, both of law and
policy. These injunctions violate principles of equity,383 create a false
universal reach of federal courts beyond the parties to a case or
controversy,384 and violate the doctrine of ripeness.385 They also promote
deleterious forum shopping within the judiciary,386 inhibit the percolation
of issues through the courts,387 and upend the principle-agent relationship
of Article III tribunals.388 These arguments hardly conclude that all
injunctions that reach beyond the parties to a case are beyond the power
of federal courts.389 As a result, the best solution is a middle-ground
approach whereby courts restrict injunctions to their own jurisdiction.
These injunctions would become binding on the executive only after two
criteria are met: (1) the district court has found proper jurisdiction and
venue to hear a given case; and (2) the court puts the executive on notice
of these findings.
It is unclear precisely how the scope of injunctions will change as
judges are continuously seen, rightly or wrongly, as essentially political
animals. Regardless, it remains urgent to maintain the integrity of Article
III courts and to do whatever is necessary to attain this end. If this means
that judges should restrict the scope of their injunctions, this may become
a necessary step in preserving the legitimacy of our judiciary.

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
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